THE IMPORTANCE OF DEFINING TERMS
Before proceeding in our inquiry, let us make sure of the meaning of our terms, for indistinctness in their use must inevitably produce ambiguity and indeterminateness in reasoning.
Not only is it requisite in economic reasoning to give to such words as "Wealth," "Capital," "Rent," "Wages," and the like, a much more definite sense than they bear in common discourse, but unfortunately, even in Political Economy, as to some of those terms no certain meaning is assigned by common consent, different writers giving to the same term different meanings, and the same writers often using a term in different senses.
It will be my effort throughout, as any term becomes of importance, to state clearly what I mean by it, and to use it in that sense and in no other. Let me ask the reader to note and to bear in mind the definitions thus given, as otherwise I cannot hope to make myself properly understood.
I shall not attempt to attach arbitrary meanings to words, or to coin terms, even when it would be convenient to do so, but shall conform to usage as closely as is possible, only endeavoring to fix the meaning of words that they may clearly express thought.
As a preliminary, let us settle what we mean by "wages" and what we mean by "capital." To the former word a sufficiently definite meaning has been given by economic writers, but the ambiguities which have attached to the use of the latter in Political Economy will require a detailed examination.
As used in common discourse " wages " means a compensation paid to a hired person for his services; and we speak of one man " working for wages," in contradistinction to another who is " working for himself." The use of the term is still further narrowed by the habit of applying it solely to compensation paid for manual labour. We do not speak of the wages of professional men, managers or clerks, but of their fees, commissions, or salaries.
Thus the common meaning of the word wages is the compensation paid to a hired person for manual labour. But in Political Economy the word wages has a much wider meaning, and includes all returns for exertion. For, as political economists explain, the three agents or factors in production are land, labour and capital, and that part of the produce which goes to the second of these factors is by them styled wages.
There is, therefore, in the politico-economic sense of the term wages no distinction as to the kind of labour, or as to whether its reward is received through an employer or not. Wages means the return received for the exertion of labour, as distinguished from the return received for the use of capital, and the return received by the landholder for the use of land.
The man who cultivates the soil for himself receives his wages in its produce, just as, if he uses his own capital and owns his own land, he may also receive interest and rent. The hunter's wages are the game he kills; the fisherman's wages are the fish he takes. The gold washed out by the self-employing gold-digger is as much his wages as the money paid to the hired coal-miner by the purchaser of his labour; and as Adam Smith shows, the high profits of retail storekeepers are in large part wages, being the recompense of their labour and not of their capital. In short, whatever is received as the result or reward of exertion in the production of wealth is wages.
This is all it is now necessary to note as to wages, but it is important to keep this in mind. For although in economic works this sense of the term wages is recognized with greater or less clearness it is often subsequently ignored.
Let us compare with each other the definitions of a few representative writers:
"That part of a man's stock," says Adam Smith, which he expects to afford him a revenue, is called his capital," and the capital of a country or society, he goes on to say, consists of (i) machines and instruments of trade which facilitate and abridge labour; (2) buildings, not mere dwellings, but which may be considered instruments of trade, such as shops, farmhouses, etc.; (3) improvements of land which better fit it for tillage or culture; (4) the acquired and useful abilities of all the inhabitants; (5) money; (6) provisions in the hands of producers and dealers, from the sale of which they expect to derive a profit; (7) the material of, or partially completed, manufactured articles still in the hands of producers or dealers; (8) completed articles still in the hands of producers or dealers. (Wealth of Nations, Book 2, Chapter I). The first four of these he styles fixed capital, and the last four circulating capital, a distinction of which it is not necessary for our purpose to take any note.
David Ricardo's definition is: " Capital is that part of the wealth of a country which is employed in production, and consists of food, clothing, tools, raw materials, machinery, etc., necessary to give effect to labour." Principles of Political Economy, chapter 5
This definition, it will be seen, is very different from that of Adam Smith, as it excludes many of the things which Smith includes, such as acquired talents, articles of mere taste or luxury in the possession of producers or dealers; and it includes some things which he does not include, such as food, clothing, etc., in the possession of the consumer.
J.R. McCulloch's definition is: " The capital of a nation really comprises all those portions of the produce of industry existing in it that may be directly employed either to support human existence or to facilitate production." - McCulloch's "Note" to book 2, chapter I of his edition, 1838, of Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations.
This definition follows the line of Ricardo's, but is wider. While it excludes everything that is not capable of aiding production, it includes everything that is so capable, without reference to actual use or necessity for use - the horse drawing a pleasure carriage being, according to McCulloch's view, as he expressly states, as much capital as the horse drawing a plough, because it may, if need arise, be used to draw a plough.
John Stuart Mill, following the same general line as Ricardo and McCulloch, makes neither the use nor the capability of use, but the determination to use, the test of capital. He says: "Whatever things arc destined to supply productive labour with the shelter, protection, tools and materials which the work requires, and to feed and otherwise maintain the labourer during the process, are capital." Principles of Political Economy, book I, chapter 4.
These quotations sufficiently illustrate the divergence of the masters.
The difficulties which beset the use of the word capital, as an exact term, and which are even more strikingly exemplified in current political and social discussions than in the definitions of economic writers, arise from two facts - first, that certain classes of things, the possession of which to the individual is precisely equivalent to the possession of capital, are not part of the capital of the community; and second, that things of the same kind may or may not be capital, according to the purpose to which they are devoted.
With a little care as to these points, there should be no difficulty in obtaining a sufficiently clear and fixed idea of what the term capital as generally used properly includes; such an idea as will enable us to say what things are capital and what are not, and to use the word without ambiguity or slip.
The term land embraces, in short, all natural materials, forces, and opportunities, and, therefore, nothing that is freely supplied by nature can properly be classed as capital. A fertile field, a rich vein of ore, a falling stream which supplies power, may give to the possessor advantages equivalent to the possession of capital, but to class such things as capital would be to put an end to the distinction between land and capital, and, so far as they relate to each other, to make the two terms meaningless.
Increase in the amount of bonds, mortgages, notes, or bank bills cannot increase the wealth of the community, since this comprises both those who are entitled to receive and those who promise to pay. Similarly, the wealth of a people would not be increased by the enslavement of some of them, for what the enslavers gained the enslaved would lose.
Increase in land values does not represent increase in the common wealth, for what landowners gain by higher prices the tenants or purchasers who must pay them will lose. And all this relative wealth, which, in common thought and speech, in legislation and law, is undistinguished from actual wealth, could, without the destruction or consumption of anything more than a few drops of ink and a piece of paper, be utterly annihilated.
Therefore, not all things which have an exchange value are wealth, in the only sense in which the term can be used in Political Economy. Only such things can be wealth the production of which increases and the destruction of which decreases the aggregate of wealth. If we consider what these things are, and what their nature is, we shall have no difficulty in defining wealth.
impressed upon matter in such a way as to store up the power of human labour to minister to human desires, as the heat of the sun is stored up in coal.
Wealth is not the sole object of labour, for labour is also expended in ministering directly to desire; but it is the object and result of what we call productive labour that is, labour which gives value to material things. Nothing that nature supplies to man without his labour is wealth, nor yet does the expenditure of labour result in wealth unless there is a tangible product that has and retains the power of ministering to desire.
Since capital is wealth devoted to a certain purpose, nothing can be capital that does not fall within this definition of wealth. By recognizing and keeping this in mind, we get rid of misconceptions which, vitiating all reasoning where they are permitted, befog popular thought and have led even acute thinkers into mazes of contradiction.
All we are trying to do, all that it is necessary to do, is to fix, as it were, the metes and bounds of a term that in the main is well apprehended; that is, to make definite a common idea.
If the articles of actual wealth existing at a given time in a given community were presented in situ to a dozen intelligent men who had never read a line of Political Economy, it is doubtful if they would differ in respect to a single item, as to whether it should be accounted capital or not.
That part of a farmer's crop held for sale or for seed, or to feed his help in part payment of wages, would be accounted capital; that held for the use of his own family would not be.
A coat that a tailor had made for sale would be accounted capital but not the coat he had made for himself.
Food in the possession of a hotel-keeper or a restaurateur would be accounted capital, but not the food in the pantry of a housewife.
Pig iron in the hands of the smelter, or founder, or dealer, would be accounted capital, but not the pig iron used as ballast in the hold of a private pleasure yacht.
The looms of a factory would be capital, but not the sewing machine of a woman who does only her own work; a building let for hire, or used for business or productive purposes, but not a dwelling-house occupied by the owner.
In short, I think we should find that now, as when Adam Smith wrote, "that part of a man's stock which he expects to yield him a revenue is called his capital." And, omitting his unfortunate slip as to personal qualities, and qualifying somewhat his enumeration of money, it is doubtful if we could better list the different articles of capital than did Adam Smith in the passage I have condensed in the previous part of this chapter.
It is as to whether its services or uses are to be exchanged or not that makes a tool an article of capital or merely an article of wealth. Thus, wealth used in the construction of a railway, a public telegraph line, a theatre, a hotel, etc., may be said to be placed in the course of exchange. The exchange is not effected all at once, but little by little, with an indefinite number of people. Yet there is an exchange, and the " consumers " of the railway, the telegraph line, the theatre or hotel, are not the owners, but the persons who from time to time use them.
Let me call attention to what is often forgotten, namely that the terms "Wealth," "Capital," "Wages" and the like, as used in Political Economy are general terms. Nothing can be generally affirmed or denied of them that cannot be affirmed or denied of the whole class of things they represent. The failure to bear this in mind has led to much confusion of thought, and permits fallacies, otherwise transparent, to pass for obvious truths. Wealth is a general term, and the idea of wealth, it must be remembered, involves the idea of exchangeability. Thus the possession of wealth to a certain amount is potentially the possession of any or all species of wealth to that equivalent in exchange. And, consequently, so of capital.
WAGES AND CAPITAL
THE CAUSE that produces poverty in the midst of advancing wealth is evidently the cause that exhibits itself in the tendency, everywhere recognized, of wages to a minimum. Let us, therefore, put our inquiry into this compact form:
Why, in spite of increase in productive power, do wages tend to a minimum that will give but a bare living?
The scholastic answer has been that wages are fixed by the ratio between the number of labourers and the amount of capital devoted to the employment of labour; and, because the increase in the number of labourers tends naturally to follow and overtake any increase in capital, wages constantly tend to the lowest amount on which labourers are able to live.
The proposition I shall endeavour to prove is: That wages, instead of being drawn from capital, are in reality drawn from the product of the labour for which they are paid.
Inasmuch as the theory that wages are provided by capital also holds that capital is reimbursed from production, this at first glance may seem a distinction without a difference. But that it is much more than a formal distinction will be apparent when it is considered that upon the difference between the two propositions are deduced doctrines that, themselves regarded as axiomatic, bound, direct, and govern the ablest minds in the discussion of the most momentous questions. For, upon the assumption that wages are drawn directly from capital, and not from the product of labour, is based, not only the doctrine that wages depend upon the ratio between capital and labour, but the doctrine that industry is limited by capital - that capital must be accumulated before labour is employed, and labour cannot be employed except as capital is accumulated; the doctrine that every increase of capital gives or is capable of giving additional employment to industry; the doctrine that the conversion of circulating capital into fixed capital lessens the fund applicable to the maintenance of labour; the doctrine that more labourers can be employed at low than at high wages; the doctrine that capital applied to agriculture will maintain more labourers than if applied to manufactures; the doctrine that profits are high or low as wages are low or high, or that they depend upon the cost of the subsistence of labourers - in short, all the teachings that are based more or less directly upon the assumption that labour is maintained and paid out of existing capital before the product, which constitutes the ultimate object, is secured:
If it be shown that this is an error, and that on the contrary the maintenance and payment of labour do not even temporarily trench on capital, but are directly drawn from the product of labour, then all this vast superstructure is left without support and must fall. And so likewise must fall the vulgar theories which also have their base in the belief that the sum to be distributed in wages is a fixed one, the individual shares in which must necessarily be decreased by an increase in the number of labourers.
The fundamental truth, which in all economic reasoning must be firmly grasped and never let go, is that society in its most highly developed form is but an elaboration of society in its rudest beginnings. Principles that are obvious in the simpler relations of men are merely disguised and not abrogated or reversed by the more intricate relations that result from the division of labour and the use of complex tools and methods. The steam grist mill, with its complicated machinery exhibiting every diversity of motion, is simply what the rude stone mortar dug up from an ancient river bed was in its day: an instrument for grinding corn. And every man engaged in it, whether tossing wood into the furnace, running the engine, dressing stones, printing sacks or keeping books, is really devoting his labour to the same purpose that the prehistoric savage had when he used his mortar: the preparation of grain for human food.
And so, if we reduce to their lowest terms all the complex operations of modern production, we see that each individual who takes part in this infinitely subdivided and intricate network of production and exchange is really doing what the primeval man did when he climbed the trees for fruit or followed the receding tide for shellfish-endeavouring to obtain from nature by the exertion of his powers the satisfaction of his desires. If we keep this firmly in mind, if we look upon the whole production of a community as the cooperation of all to satisfy the various desires of each, we see plainly that the reward each obtains for his exertion comes as truly and certainly from nature as the result of that exertion, as did the reward of the first man.
To illustrate: In the simplest state we can conceive of, each man digs his own bait and catches his own fish. The advantages of the division of labour soon become apparent, and one digs bait while the others fish. Yet evidently the one who digs bait is in reality doing as much towards the catching of fish as any of those who actually take the fish. So when the advantages of canoes are discovered, and instead of all going a-fishing, one stays behind and makes and repairs canoes, the canoe-maker is in reality devoting his labour to the taking of fish as much as the actual fishermen, and the fish that he eats at night when the fishermen come home are as truly the product of his labour as of theirs. And thus when the division of labour is fairly inaugurated and, instead of each attempting to satisfy all of his wants by direct resort to nature, one fishes, another hunts, a third picks berries, a fourth gathers fruit, a fifth makes tools, a sixth builds huts, and a seventh prepares clothing - each one to the extent he exchanges the direct product of his own labour for the direct product of the labour of others is really applying his own labour to the production of the things he uses. He is in effect satisfying his particular desires by the exertion of his particular powers; that is to say, what he receives he in reality produces.
If we follow these principles, obvious enough in a simpler state of society, through the complexities of the state we call civilized, we shall see clearly that in every case in which labour is exchanged for commodities, production really precedes enjoyment. We shall see that wages are the earnings-that is to say, the makings - of labour, not the advances of capital, and that the labourer who receives his wages in money (coined or printed, it may be, before his labour commenced) really receives in return for the addition his labour has made to the general stock of wealth a draft upon that general stock, which he may utilize in any particular form of wealth that will best satisfy his desires.
Neither the money, which is but the draft, nor the particular form of wealth that he calls for by use of the draft, represents advances of capital for his maintenance; on the contrary it represents the wealth, or a portion of the wealth, his labour has already added to the general stock.
|The wages he receives at the end of the week, what are they but the certificate to all the world that he has done these things-the primary exchanges in the long series that transmutes his labour into the things he has really been labouring for?|